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Abstract The Finnish taxi industry has already long been 
technologically developed, and since 2011 taxi hailing apps have 
been available in Finland. The amount of these apps has steadily 
increased, spurred by the arrival of Uber and Taxify in Finland 
in 2014, and by the de-regulation of the Finnish taxi industry in 
July 2018. In the present paper, the aim was to identify ride-
hailing app acquisition related strategies that traditional Finnish 
dispatch organizations (DOs) employ. A qualitative case study 
with five focus organizations was conducted between 2018-2020. 
This study contributes to extant research in two ways. First, by 
identifying five ride-hailing app strategies employed by DOs 
(three related to the question of make vs. buy, two related to 
discontinuing/selling). Second, by showing that different ride-
hailing apps can play different strategic roles – which helps 
explain DOs’ multihoming strategy – and that the strategic role 
of a specific ride-hailing app can change over time. 
616 33
RD BLED ECONFERENCE 
ENABLING TECHNOLOGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Taxi hailing platforms such as Uber, Taxify, Didi and Yango offer consumers the 
possibility to order or “hail” rides via an app (Harding et al. 2016). When Uber 
entered the San Francisco market in 2010, this service that allowed consumers to 
hail a ride with an app was quite unique. In 2014, Uber and Taxify (named Bolt in 
March 2019) entered the Finnish market, and only few other ride-hailing apps had 
been available at that time in Finland. Now, partly due to a de-regulation of the 
Finnish Taxi market in 2018 (Heikkilä and Heikkilä 2019), an abundance of ride-
hailing apps is available in Finland. Interestingly, most of these apps are not provided 
by international ride sharing platform providers, but by traditional Finnish taxi 
dispatch organizations (DO). These DOs' apps represent a mobile channel 
(Crittenden et al. 2017) for ordering taxi rides, in addition to the more traditional 
channels such as phone, email, text message, and street hailing. 
 
Extant research on ride-hailing apps has mainly focused on apps provided by large, 
internationally operating organizations such as Uber, Lyft and Didi (e.g., Zhang et 
al. 2020, Leng et al. 2018, Harding et al. 2016). Research on ride-hailing apps 
provided by smaller, local taxi dispatch organizations (DO) has been very rare 
(exceptions include Väyrynen et al. 2018; Niemimaa et al. 2019 touch upon the 
topic).  
 
In order to provide a ride-hailing app, i.e., a mobile channel to hail a ride, the DO 
first has to acquire such an app – and whether to make or buy a good such as a 
mobile app is an important strategic question for the organization (Williamson 1973). 
Against this backdrop, we ask the following research question: “What strategies related 
to ride-hailing app acquisition do traditional taxi dispatch organizations employ?”  
 
To answer this question, we conducted an empirical qualitative case study among a 
taxi owner-drivers’ federation and four traditional taxi DOs and analyzed what 
different strategies they employed regarding ride-hailing apps. We make two contri-
butions to extant research. First, we identify five different strategies traditional DOs 
employ related to providing consumers with the possibility to hail a taxi ride via an 
app. Second, we show that different ride-hailing apps can have different strategic 
roles (which can change over time). This helps explain why not only drivers and cus-
tomers, but also DOs use several ride-hailing apps simultaneously, i.e., multihome.  
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2 Make or buy as strategic options for software acquisition  
 
One important strategic question for any organization is how to acquire a good - 
whether to make or buy it (Williamson 1973). ‘Make’ refers to producing a good in-
house, whereas ‘buy’ means that it is purchased on the market. Comparative 
production costs for making versus buying have the greatest influence on the 
decision of whether to make or buy something, but also volume uncertainty and 
supplier market competition affect the decision (Walker and Weber 1987). This logic 
can also be applied to software as a good, which mobile apps represent. From a 
strategic point of view, previous research has distinguished between different types 
of software. We here subscribe to Väyrynen and Iivari’s (2015) distinction between 
commercial off-the-shelf software (COTS), customizable/configurable software, 
and tailor-made software. COTS is software where many copies of the product are 
sold, that can be purchased on the market, and that is ready-to-run, whereas tailor-
made software is developed for a specific company’s needs with only one copy of 
the software being produced (Xu and Brinkkemper 2007). Tailor-made software can 
be developed in-house or can be contractual tailor-made by an external software 
provider (ibid.). Customizable/configurable software, e.g., ERP software, is ready-
made but not ready-to-run (Väyrynen and Iivari 2015). It can be purchased from a 
software provider but has to be configured (i.e., adjustments are made to software 
parameters without changing the software at the code-level) or customized (changes 
made to the software at the code level) before it can be used (Lee et al. 2003; Light 
2001). From a strategic point of view, Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is comparable to 
COTS software, as both are available to all on the market (Väyrynen and Iivari 2015). 
Whereas in COTS the customer pays a one-time fee and possesses full ownership of 
the software, in SaaS the customer usually pays a fee per transaction (Ma 2007). To 
summarize, the main strategic options for acquiring software (e.g., a mobile app) are 
to buy software (e.g., COTS/SaaS, customizable/configurable, or contractual tailor-
made software) or make it (in-house developed tailor-made software).  
 
3 Research methodology 
 
Case and research context. The first Finnish taxi hailing app appeared in 2011. In 
2014, both Uber and Taxify entered the Finnish market with their apps. In contrast 
to Uber who only collaborated with drivers, Taxify also sought collaboration with 
traditional DOs. DOs do not own the taxis they dispatch, but most DOs are owned 
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by the entrepreneurs whose cars are dispatched by the organization. During the past 
2 years, the Finnish taxi industry has undergone the biggest changes in its history. 
Having been one of the most strictly regulated taxi markets in the European Union, 
it was de-regulated in July 2018. Before the de-regulation, the taxi market had been 
separated into geographic areas, each geographic area being served by one taxi DO. 
The number of taxi licenses was regulated, and the Finnish government defined the 
maximum taxi prices. With the de-regulation, the number of taxi licenses was not 
any more fixed, prices were not any more regulated, and DOs were overnight 
competing. It is in this context that more and more DOs started to acquire ride-
hailing apps. 
 
Data collection. This research is part of a larger, longitudinal research project on 
the digital transformation of the Finnish taxi industry which has been ongoing since 
autumn 2017. The present research is a qualitative, interpretive case study (Walsham 
1995). For the present study, 20 interviews (see Table 1) were analyzed that were 
conducted with 4 DOs (Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta) in different regions in Finland, 
Taxify, a provider of contractual tailor-made software, and the Finnish Taxi Owner-
Drivers’ Federation (FTOF) who developed a taxi hailing app for DOs.  
 
Table 1: Interviews with focus organizations 
 
Organization Interview # (when conducted, interview length) 
FTOF Int 1 (Q1/2018, 1:15:15); Int 2 (Q1/2018, 1:27:36); Int 3 (Q1/2018, 1:35:07); 
Int 4 (Q4/2018, 1:39:43); Int 5 (Q4/2018, 1:50:55); Int 6 (Q4/2019, 2:12:52) 
Alpha Int 7 (Q1/2018, 1:39:20); Int 8 (Q4/2018, 1:32:03);  
Int 9 (Q4/2019, 1:08:14); Int 10 (Q4/2019, 0:48:21) 
Beta  Int 11 (Q1/2018, 1:48:07); Int 12 (Q2/2018, 0:31:00);  
Int 13 (Q4/2018, 1:30:56); Int 14 (Q4/2019, 1:29:25) 
Gamma  Int 15 (Q4, 2018, 3:38:30), Int 16 (Q4, 2019, 1:46:54) 
Delta  Int 17 (Q4/2018, 2:17:35); Int 18 (Q1/2020, 1:16:30) 
Software provider Int 19 (Q1/2018, 1:25:55) 
Taxify Int 20 (Q1/2018, 1:04:06) 
 
Qualitative interviews represent one of the most important data gathering sources in 
Information Systems research (Myers and Newman 2007) and were the main source 
of information in this study. The interview themes revolved around the digitalization 
of the Finnish taxi industry, taxi hailing apps, the change of the law in July 2018 and 
its effects on the industry. In some interviews, two interviewees participated. All 
interviews were transcribed. Quotes are translations from Finnish to English. 
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Data analysis. NVivo software (version 12) was used when analyzing the interviews. 
First, all text passages were extracted from the interviews that concerned those apps 
that were available in the Finnish taxi market and through which rides dispatched by 
Finnish taxi DOs could be ordered. Second, information was extracted regarding the 
ride-hailing app strategies the focus organizations (FTOF, Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and 
Delta) employed over time. A timeline was created for each focus organization 
regarding when a certain app was acquired or sold or its use discontinued. 
Information from the interviews was triangulated with information from print media 
articles and material received from the organizations. As a result of the data analysis, 
five different strategies (see Table 2) were identified. The term “app” is used 
henceforth, while acknowledging that a ride-hailing app is not a stand-alone software 
but has to be integrated with some platform or dispatch system to function. 
 
4 Findings 
 
Next, for each focus organization the ride-hailing app acquisition related strategies 
that it employed over time are described. Five different ride-hailing app strategies 
(referred to as S1 – S5) could be identified: (S1) develop a ride-hailing app in-house, 
(S2) join an existing ride-hailing app/platform, (S3) purchase a ride-hailing 
app/platform, (S4) sell a ride-hailing app/platform, and (S5) discontinue use of a 
ride-hailing app/platform.  
 
FTOF  
 
The FTOF supports its members’ (taxi entrepreneurs and DOs) interests. Based on 
discussions initiated in 2013, in 2014 the FTOF’s business unit started to develop a 
taxi-hailing app in-house (S1) which would then be provided to the Finnish DOs. 
FTOF App was launched in April 2015. One reason for why the FTOF started 
developing the app was: “Most of the DOs that are members of the FTOF are so small, and 
I also count our DO to those, that we do not have the resources to build our own app. […] Those 
large DOs who have more than 1000 cars, 4000 drivers, they have enough volume that it makes 
sense [for them]F to develop their own app.” (Beta representative) The FTOF App was 
integrated over the following two years with more than 30 Finnish DOs using five 
different types of dispatch systems. The DOs paid a fee to the FTOF's business unit 
for each taxi ride that a customer ordered via FTOF App. The app was successful 
and used all over Finland, thus representing the app through which consumers could 
hail a taxi ride almost anywhere in Finland. After having provided the app for 2 years, 
620 33
RD BLED ECONFERENCE 
ENABLING TECHNOLOGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 
 
  
in the light of the coming de-regulation of the law, the FTOF decided to sell FTOF 
App to the highest bidding Finnish DO (S4) in spring 2018.  
 
Alpha (large dispatch organization) 
 
Alpha developed in-house and launched its first taxi hailing app (Alpha App 1) in 
2011 (S1) and launched several updates of the app over the years. Alpha joined 
FTOF App in 2015 (S2). In 2016, Alpha App 2 replaced Alpha App 1 (S5). Alpha 
App 2 was developed in-house (S1), with functionalities very similar to those of Uber 
at the time. In November 2017, Alpha discontinued the FTOF App collaboration 
(S5). Especially two factors affected this decision: first, the slow technological 
development of FTOF App due to the need to integrate FTOF App with five 
different dispatch system types used by Finnish DOs. Second, the soon-to-come de-
regulation of the Taxi market: as competition was expected to increase strongly, 
Alpha wanted to make sure their customers would be tied to their own Alpha App 
2 instead of to FTOF App. In spring 2018, Alpha purchased FTOF App when it 
became available for sale (S3): “Why we purchased FTOF App? Because it was for sale. 
That’s a quite good answer, that if such a good product is for sale, then why would we not have 
wanted to buy it? […] it’s a working system and has maybe also future potential.” In addition, 
Alpha started to offer its taxi dispatch services also to other geographic regions in 
Finland, and as part of this also offers their own app under a different name to other 
DOs (S4). Alpha thus used Alpha App1/Alpha App 2 concurrently with FTOF App 
between 2015-2017, and from spring 2018 onwards. 
 
Beta (mid-sized dispatch organization) 
 
In November 2014, Taxify entered the Finnish market and sought to collaborate 
with Finnish taxi DOs and individual drivers. Beta was one Finnish DO that joined 
the Taxify platform (S2). The decision to collaborate with Taxify was made with the 
expectation that Taxify would become a large international player that would 
increase customer numbers for Beta, and because Beta wanted to offer its customers 
an additional channel to hail cars apart from its more traditional channels (e.g., 
phone, email, text message, online form, street hailing). Taxify App was not 
integrated with Beta’s dispatch system, and taxi drivers had a separate phone in the 
car to take rides that customers ordered through Taxify App. In autumn 2015, Beta 
joined FTOF App (S2) because this app was expected to be more widely used than 
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if Beta would have developed or purchased an own app. Beta used Taxify App and 
FTOF App concurrently for one year, before it ended its collaboration with Taxify 
(S5) in autumn 2016. One reason for discontinuing Taxify App use was that Taxify 
App was more expensive for them to use than FTOF App. When FTOF App 
became available for sale in 2018, Beta participated in the bidding (attempted S3) 
which Alpha won. Due to speculations whether Alpha would be purchased by a big 
international taxi corporation, Beta feared to be dependent on an app owned by a 
(due to the legal change) soon-to-be competitor. They thus decided to also acquire 
an own app: “We wanted to make sure that the control and ownership of our app rides would 
not directly flow to one of the biggest competitors.” When the attempted purchase of FTOF 
App failed, Beta considered whether to acquire the app offered by their dispatch 
system provider, or a contractual tailor-made app. Beta was mainly concerned that 
the costs of integrating a contractual tailor-made app with their dispatch system 
would be very high. Thus, Beta purchased Beta App (S3), the taxi hailing app 
provided by their dispatch systems provider, as this was the fastest way to get a 
working app into use already in autumn 2018. Alpha was not sold to the international 
competitor, and Beta felt that they maybe should have acquired a tailor-made app, 
as they are a bit dis-contented with the Beta App. At present, Beta uses both FTOF 
App and Beta App.  
 
Gamma (large dispatch organization) 
 
Gamma launched its first app, Gamma App 1, in 2015. This app had come as part 
of the dispatch system that Gamma had purchased (S3). In addition, also Gamma 
joined FTOF App in 2015 (S2), but discontinued FTOF App use (S5) in 2018, when 
Alpha purchased FTOF App. Gamma has not been quite contented with Gamma 
App 1: “From a usability perspective it was almost impossible: very rambling boring and difficult 
and really bad. We right away told them we were discontented, that usability is not at a present-day 
level.” Despite promises from the dispatch system provider over several years, the 
agreed-on improvements to Gamma App 1 were not made. Therefore, in spring 
2018, Gamma started to make specifications for the kind of app they were looking 
for, negotiated with different app providers, and finally ordered Gamma App 2 to 
be developed by a Finnish software company (S3) which already had developed 
several other taxi hailing apps. After four months of development, Gamma App 2 
was launched in November 2018 and Gamma App 1 use discontinued (S5). Gamma 
App 1, if already installed on a customer’s phone, was automatically updated to 
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Gamma App 2. Between 2015-2018, Gamma used both FTOF App and Gamma 
App 1, whereas at present (May 2020) they only use Gamma App 2. 
 
Delta (mid-sized dispatch organization) 
 
Delta joined and was integrated with FTOF App in April 2015 (S2). Even though 
Delta was contented with FTOF App, they felt that ownership and control aspects 
were problematic: “There was a problem with FTOF App, and that was the ownership 
structure, that it was not really in anyone’s control […], but in any case it was in no way in our 
own control.” Therefore, they started to consider other options and decided to acquire 
a contractual tailor-made app (S3), Delta App: “We considered different options and 
collaboration options, can we make an application together with several other actors, and we studied 
existing apps and their prices, and after a lot of phases [of deliberation] we decided to acquire our 
own app.” Delta made specifications for the app and then ordered it from a software 
company. One important aspect in purchasing their own app was control over 
customership. FTOF App was seen as an app that was linked to some taxi, but Delta 
App was seen as a way to link customers to Delta directly and a channel to be in 
direct contact with their customers. Delta App was launched in October 2018. At 
present, Delta uses both FTOF App and Delta App.  
 
5 Discussion 
 
We asked the question what strategies related to ride-hailing app acquisition 
traditional taxi DOs employ. We make two contributions. First, we identified five 
different ride-hailing app strategies employed by the focus organizations (Table 2). 
Three of these strategies concern the acquisition (make vs. buy) of the app (S1, S2, 
S3), whereas two strategies are related to the “flipside of the same coin” – strategies 
related to selling an app (S4) or discontinuing use of an app (S5). In line with the 
research question, and due to page limitations, we focus here on discussing the three 
app acquisition strategies (S1, S2, S3) in more detail. Second, we show that all DOs 
at some point in time used two different ride-hailing apps concurrently. In line with 
previous research we refer to this strategy as multihoming. One possible reason for 
multihoming are the different strategic roles that different ride-hailing apps play. 
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Table 2: Ride-hailing app strategies employed by focus organizations 
 
Org S1 
(develop) 
S2 (join) S3 (purchase) S4 (sell) S5 
(discontinue) 
FTOF FTOF App    FTOF App  
Alpha Alpha App 1  
Alpha App 2  
FTOF App FTOF App Alpha App 2 Alpha App 1 
FTOF App 
Beta  Taxify 
FTOF App 
Beta App (CS)  Taxify 
Gamma  FTOF App Gamma App 1 
(CS) 
Gamma App 2 
(CTM) 
 FTOF App 
Gamma App 
1 
Delta  FTOF App Delta App (CTM)   
Legend: contractual tailor-made software (CTM); customizable/configurable software (CS)  
 
One important strategic question for an organization is whether to make or buy a 
certain good (Walker and Weber 1987). In-house tailor-made software represents 
the “make” strategy, whereas COTS/SaaS, customizable/configurable software, 
and contractual tailor-made software represent options for a “buy” strategy (Xu 
and Brinkkemper 2007; Väyrynen and Iivari 2015). The strategies we identified 
correspond well to these strategic options. The strategy to develop a ride-hailing app 
in-house (S1), and to buy customizable/configurable software or contractual tailor-
made software (both represented in S3) was employed by several DOs. Only Alpha 
developed their ride-hailing apps in-house, being a technological forerunner amongst 
Finnish DOs with their first ride-hailing app implemented already in 2011 when no 
suppliers for ready-made ride-hailing apps existed, only leaving the option of a tailor-
made app. The competition of suppliers for a certain good influences the decision 
whether to make or buy a good (Walker and Weber 1987), and in the ride-hailing 
app market, the number of these different suppliers and strategic options for DOs 
to acquire a ride-hailing app certainly increased since 2014. Both the strategy to 
acquire a configurable/customizable app provided by the dispatch system provider 
(e.g., Beta App, Gamma App 1), and the strategy to order a contractual tailor-made 
app (e.g., Gamma App 2, Delta App) were employed by Finnish DOs. Acquisition 
of an app that was not provided by the dispatch system provider that the DO already 
used usually meant a more difficult technical integration of the app with the dispatch 
system. In addition to the different available (potential) providers of ride-hailing 
apps, also the DO’s available financial resources affected the app-strategy. Most 
Finnish DOs are small and do not have the resources to develop an app, which was 
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also one of the reasons why the FTOF business unit started to develop FTOF App. 
In addition to the above strategies, we also identified the strategy to join an 
existing app (S2). This strategy was employed by Alpha when collaborating with 
Taxify, but also by all four DOs in connection to FTOF App. In the context of ride-
hailing, the strategy to join a ride-hailing app has been addressed concerning whether 
drivers or consumers choose to join a ride-hailing app as service providers or service 
consumers (e.g., Belleflamme and Peitz 2019). With our study, we show that this 
question surprisingly is also relevant for DOs, who otherwise act as the intermediary 
between drivers and customers. When considering what of the strategic options for 
acquiring an app this represents, we made an interesting observation: in this strategy, 
the DO did not buy the app, but paid the provider of the app (e.g., Taxify, FTOF 
business unit) a transaction-based fee. SaaS refers to software that is not owned by 
the customer (in contrast to COTS) but where customers pay based on the 
transactions done with the software (Ma 2007). Thus, Taxify and FTOF business 
unit could be seen to have acted as a “mobile app as a service” providers for Finnish 
DOs. DOs paid also a transaction-based fee for rides that had been hailed with 
FTOF App and did not own the app themselves, which would fit the SaaS scheme. 
However, there is one important difference between FTOF App and Taxify: FTOF 
App had to be integrated with the DO’s dispatch system, whereas Taxify did not. 
COTS ride-hailing apps do not seem to exist for dispatch organizations, as these 
apps seem to require quite effortful integration with the DO’s dispatch system.  
 
Our second contribution concerns our finding that all DOs in our study at one time 
or another used simultaneously two different ride-hailing apps through which 
customers could order rides dispatched by that organization. Previous research has 
referred to the situation where service providers (such as DOs represent by 
providing their dispatch services to drivers and consumers) use different, competing 
platforms as “multihoming” (Belleflamme and Peitz 2019). In a ride-hailing (e.g., 
Uber, Lyft) and renting (e.g., AirBnB) platform context, multihoming has referred 
to situations where drivers/hosts offer their services concurrently in several ride 
sharing or rental platforms, or where consumers (e.g., riders, renters) use several 
platforms to search for the best price (e.g., Bryan and Gans 2019). We argue that 
when DOs provide their customers and drivers with two or more ride-hailing app 
channels, this, too, represents multihoming. The question then is why DOs engage 
in this practice? One reason is that different ride-hailing apps play a different 
strategic role for the DO and serve different types of customers. FTOF App 
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compared to DOs own “branded apps” is a good example of different strategic roles 
of ride-hailing apps. FTOF App – first developed when Finnish DOs represented 
regional monopolies and did not compete with each other – at that time represented 
a possibility for practically all Finnish DOs to offer their customers a mobile channel 
(Crittenden et al. 2017) to hail a ride. However, through the de-regulation of the 
industry, which turned DOs from regional monopolies into competitors, the 
importance of tying the customer to a specific DO significantly increased. Previous 
research already found that apps can take a role in the branding efforts of 
organizations (Zhao and Balagué 2015). The present research shows that the DOs 
own “branded” apps fulfil the strategic role of tying the customer to a specific DO. 
In contrast, nowadays FTOF App has the role of serving especially customers that 
travel within Finland and with which rides can be hailed from different DOs all over 
Finland. Therefore, the different roles that FTOF App and DOs’ “branded” apps 
play offer one explanation for why DOs multihome. In this context we also want to 
point out that the strategic role of a specific ride-hailing app for a DO is not 
static – it can change over time. A good example of this is FTOF App. It changed 
from a sought-for digital taxi hailing channel to a channel that was not tying 
customers directly to the DO. Then, when Alpha purchased the FTOF App in 2018, 
the app even turned into a potential threat as some DOs feared they might lose their 
customers to their competitor. This change in the strategic role of an app is also one 
reason for why a DO might acquire (S1, S2, S3), sell (S4), or discontinue use of a 
ride-hailing app (S5). 
 
To summarize, which ride-hailing app strategy a DO employed at what point in time 
was dependent on the available options for acquiring or joining an app, financial 
resources available, urgency of acquiring an app (buying an existing app is usually 
“faster” than tailor-made software development), strategic role of an app, ownership 
over an app (who “owns” the customers), and changes to the institutional 
environment (from a heavily regulated to a de-regulated industry).  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
We asked what strategies related to ride-hailing app acquisition traditional taxi DOs 
employ. We make two contributions. First, we identified five strategies employed by 
the four Finnish DOs in the focus of the study. Three represented the make vs. buy 
options for acquiring an app (developing an app in-house, joining an existing app, 
and purchasing an app), whereas two are related to the flipside of that coin (selling 
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an app, and discontinuing use of an app). Second, we show that the concept of 
multihoming – i.e., of using more than one ride-hailing app simultaneously – not 
only applies to drivers and riders, but also to DOs. We explain this strategic choice 
through our observation that different ride-hailing apps can play different strategic 
roles. Our study has practical implications for DOs by pointing towards different 
options for ride-hailing app acquisition, and by drawing attention to the question of 
what strategic role a certain ride-hailing app can or should play. Our research also 
has limitations. We focused specifically on identifying the strategies employed, but 
not on the process of strategizing in more detail. In addition, our research is 
conducted in Finland at a time of a taxi industry de-regulation, and our findings thus 
might not be applicable to other contexts (e.g., taxi markets that are regulated 
differently). Future research should investigate in more detail the different aspects 
that affect, and practices that are related to, DOs’ ride-hailing app strategies. 
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